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Back to the Future: Reviving the Use of Video Link
Evidence in Canadian Criminal Courts
Helena Gluzman*
Abstract
Section 714.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada allows for witnesses and victims
to testify remotely via video link, within Canada. The legal test embedded within
this provision — “appropriate in all the circumstances” — has led to inconsistent
application across the country. Some jurists have embraced the flexibility provided
by the video link process. Others have expressed reluctance, articulating the
position that in-court testimony is to be preferred and permitting the use of video
link evidence only in exceptional circumstances. R. v. S.D.L. is the first treatment
of s. 714.1 by an appellate court. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has provided a
set of clear guiding principles for trial judges. The court recognized that
applications for testimony via video link “should be permitted” so long as they do
not negatively impact upon trial fairness or the open court principle. More
specifically, where reliability (rather than credibility) is the central issue with
respect to evaluating a witness’ evidence, video link applications should routinely be
granted. The use of technology in the courtroom can thus contribute to the truth
seeking function of the trial process and provide support for vulnerable victims and
witnesses who may otherwise face greater personal costs through the process of
testimony.
INTRODUCTION
Technology is developing rapidly and impacting every aspect of our social
fabric. The criminal justice system should be no exception, particularly in the use
of technology to allow for remote testimony. As Justice Duncan wrote in R. v.
Allen over 10 years ago,
[W]here Parliament has authorized the use of new technology to
address a problem, courts should not hesitate to embrace it, where
appropriate. There should be no bias in favour of doing things the
traditional way. . ..1
Rules of evidence ‘‘are not cast in stone.”2 Section 714.1 of the Criminal Code
of Canada seeks to enable witnesses within and outside of Canada to testify by
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1 R. v. Allen, 2007 ONCJ 209, 2007 CarswellOnt 3044 (C.J.) at para. 15 [Allen].
2 R. v. Levogiannis, 1993 CarswellOnt 131, 1993 CarswellOnt 996, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 475, at
para. 22 [Levogiannis]. While the focus of this decision was the constitutionality of
permitting a child witness to testify behind a screen, many of the concerns raised in that
video link.3 For a witness testifying within Canada, the party calling that
evidence has a burden to satisfy the court that the video link evidence is
‘‘appropriate in all the circumstances”. In the appropriate circumstances, the use
of remote video link evidence presents a ‘‘genuine attempt to bring the relevant
and probative evidence before the trier of fact in order to foster the search for
truth.”4 However, the wording of this provision leaves much room for the
exercise of judicial discretion. While some jurists embrace the flexibility provided
by the use of technology to allow for remote witness testimony,5 others have
expressed reluctance. Part of the reason for this inconsistency lies in the lack of a
uniform approach to interpreting the discretionary standard laid out in s. 714.1
of ‘‘appropriate in all the circumstances.”
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in the recent case of R. v. S.D.L.6 has
recognized the lacuna that existed in the legal interpretation surrounding the use
of video link evidence. In what appears to be the first treatment of s. 714.1 by an
appellate court in Canada, R. v. S.D.L. has provided guidance to trial judges
which, if followed across the country, will provide clarity as to the use of video
link technology to facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims and witnesses.
Overview of s. 714.1 and the State of the Law Prior to R. v. S.D.L.
Section 714.1 provides that the court ‘‘may” receive the evidence of a witness
located in Canada by video link where the trial judge is satisfied that doing so
would be ‘‘appropriate in all the circumstances”, including:
(a) the location and personal circumstances of the witness;
(b) the costs that would be incurred if the witness had to be physically present;
and
(c) the nature of the witness’s anticipated evidence.
These factors must be considered in hearing an application under s. 714.1,
but others might be relevant. The statutory language makes it clear that an order
under this section is discretionary.
case (the right to face one’s accuser and impact upon cross-examination) are equally
applicable to the context of remote video link testimony.
3 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 714.1.
4 Levogiannis, supra note 2 at para. 22.
5 See, for instance, R. v. D.R.D., [2007] O.J. No. 1806 at paras. 9 — 10 (Ont. C.J./Youth
J.C.):
These types of innovations are being used in medicine, where quite literally people
are attending at clinics and receiving treatment at the hands of a general physician
or even a nurse practitioner, based on the directions of some more experienced
person in a large city centre.
It is clear to me that the times have changed and that it is not reasonable to insist
that all persons giving evidence must be physically present in the courtroom.
6 2017 NSCA 58, 2017 CarswellNS 453 (C.A.) [S.D.L.].
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The personal circumstances of the witness include not only location and
health, but age and employment, and the degree that travel might interfere with
the witness’s personal life. As Justice Topolniski wrote in R. v. Ragan,7 s. 714.1
may be properly invoked on the basis of ‘‘pressing personal” concerns:
As evidenced by the cases which have considered s. 714.1, this provision
generally is applied when the witness lives at a distance from the locale of the trial
and a cost-benefit analysis favours allowing their virtual presence. In some cases,
the section is used when the witness is subject to infirmity, risk to health or pressing
personal or business concerns which preclude or raise a significant barrier to their
testifying in person. In my view, that is the intention of the provision.
While recognizing that witnesses volunteer their time to fulfill the critical role
of providing testimony and forwarding the truth-seeking function of the courts,
Justice Topolinski wrote that ‘‘[a]n appearance in court remains the preferred
method for receiving testimony.”8 A witness must have ‘‘a good reason” to
overcome the preferred method of in-court testimony, which ‘‘can be constituted
by significant inconvenience to a witness to appear.”9
The ‘‘good reason” at hand in R. v. Ragan arose because the witness, Mr.
Bissett, had been shot in the back of the head, while armed and wearing a bullet
proof vest. His assailant was not identified and he continued to live in fear,
suspecting that his shooting was somehow linked to Mr. Ragan. His testimony
revolved around the fact that he alleged he had been hired by Mr. Ragan to carry
out a hit. He suffered a significant brain injury as well as anxiety, which became
amplified as the time drew closer to travel back to the vicinity of the shooting for
the purpose of testimony at trial. Mr. Bissett’s doctor provided an opinion on the
video link application that ‘‘‘minimizing contact with the perpetrators of his
injury’ would be in the best interests of Mr. Bissett’s mental health.”10 Mr.
Bissett’s evidence was characterized as ‘‘central”11 to the case.
Mr. Bissett’s credibility was to be assessed by a jury. Justice Topolinski was
in ‘‘no way satisfied”12 that Mr. Bissett’s health presented a ‘‘significant barrier”
to his ability to be present in court, in light of that credibility assessment. In
dismissing the application for remote testimony, Justice Topolniski did come to
the following conclusion:
. . .I am satisfied that the technology would be adequate to permit a free-
flowing cross-examination and that the right to face one’s accuser can be
met by virtual presence. . ..13
7 2008 ABQB 658, 2008 CarswellAlta 2307 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 32 (emphasis added)
[Ragan].
8 Ragan, ibid, at para. 39.
9 Ibid (emphasis added).
10 Ibid, at para. 6.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid, at para. 61.
13 Ibid (emphasis added).
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Other jurists have also pointed out that video link evidence cannot capture
demeanour as fulsomely as being in the direct, continuous and immediate
presence of a witness. And while demeanour evidence on its own is not a reliable
way to determine credibility, nonverbal responses of a witness still have a part to
play in an overall assessment of credibility. While noting that the right to
confront one’s accuser is not absolute, Justice Ricchetti wrote in R. v. Dessouza:
There can be no doubt it is best when the evidence is given in court
[because. . ..] the ability of the trier of fact to observe the witness [is. . .]
best achieved with live testimony by a witness.14
Mr. Dessouza’s case had been before the courts for 16 years. The
complainant alleged that she had been sexually assaulted at knife point. She
had been diligent in attending the scheduled preliminary hearing dates in 1997,
2003 and 2009, as well as subsequent trial dates. She became increasingly
reluctant to attend court and by the time the matter was to be heard by Justice
Ricchetti, she refused to attend in person even in the face of a possible arrest
warrant. Mr. Dessouza’s actions (leaving the country and failing to attend) had
caused nine years of the lengthy delay.
While ultimately granting the Crown’s application for video link testimony,
Justice Ricchetti wrote that such decisions should be confined to the ‘‘rarest of
cases.”15 His Honour deemed the circumstances before him to be ‘‘rare and
exceptional”.16 In allowing the primary witness in a sexual assault trial to testify
remotely, His Honour concluded that there was ‘‘very little negative”17 impact
upon defence counsel’s ability to cross-examine the complainant and attempt to
undermine her credibility before the jury, in part because she had been cross-
examined previously at a preliminary inquiry. He also made the following
observation:
[W]hile a cross examination over a video link may not be as compelling
to a jury, neither will the examination in chief of the Crown’s primary
witness.18
By contrast, Justice Duncan found in the oft-cited decision of R. v. Allen,19
that in some respects evidence received via video link is superior to evidence
14 2012 ONSC 145, 2012 CarswellOnt 982 (S.C.J.) at para. 24 [Dessouza]. Justice Richettie
also expressed concern regarding the glitches that may be associated with reliance on
technology and the practical realities of translating the trial process onto the screen, such
as the use of exhibits.
15 Dessouza, ibid, at para. 26.
16 Ibid, at para. 28.
17 Dessouza, ibid, at para. 36.
18 Ibid.
19 Allen, supra note 1, at para. 26.Allenwas decided specifically in the context of permitting
awitness or victim to testify remotely due to safety concerns, under a distinct provisionof
theCriminal Code. However, His Honour’s commentary regarding the nuances of video
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received in open court. Video link evidence equips the trier of fact with unique
tools to assess a witness’s demeanour as it permits the audience to see a full face-
on video of the witness, as opposed to the profile view often seen by a judge or
jury in open court. Because evidence tendered via video link can be taped, it can
also be replayed by a trier of fact when considering their ultimate verdict. His
Honour also noted that the video link evidence of children is ‘‘routinely” received
through the closed circuit video provision of s. 715.1 and ‘‘credibility assessments
are not hampered by the procedure”.20
Justice Duncan also emphasized that an accused has no constitutional right
to an in-person face-to-face confrontation with a complainant. His Honour
wrote:
The main objection is that the entire truth seeking process suffers by
permitting the witness to ‘‘mail it in” - to give evidence at a distance
without his being brought into the presence of those he is accusing and
the solemn and majestic atmosphere of the courthouse. It is said that
there is a right to confrontation that is infringed or at least diluted by
the video-link process. However such right of confrontation as exists in
Canada is a qualified right and can be subject to exceptions designed to
achieve some valid purpose in the administration of justice . . . .21
These words hearken back to those of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.
L. (D.O).22 In upholding the constitutionality of permitting child witnesses to
provide their testimony through previously recorded video statements under s.
715.1, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé wrote:
Based on this Court’s pronouncements that the principles of funda-
mental justice reflect a spectrum of interests from the rights of the
accused to broader social concerns, a fair trial must encompass a
recognition of society’s interests. Our Canadian society has a vested
interest in the enforcement of criminal law in a manner that is both fair to
link evidence have been adopted or referenced by numerous judgements across various
provinces in applications pertaining to s. 714.1.
20 Ibid. More recently, in the context of permitting testimony via closed circuit in a case
involving gang intimidation, Justice Goldstein wrote at para. 25 of R. v. Oppong, 2017
ONSC2978, 2017CarswellOnt 7556 (S.C.J.): ‘‘I do not accept thatCCTVwill in anyway
impede cross-examination.” Joanne Barrett provides this helpful commentary regarding
any differences in assessing how testifying via closed circuit video may change a child’s
demeanour:
[T]o the extent that a child’s reactions may be ‘‘altered” if the child does not have to look at the
accused while testifying, research suggests that it is in a manner that assists the ultimate truth-
seeking objective of criminal proceedings. Indeed, studies demonstrate that children who testify
using CCTV or a screen are less anxious and therefore better able to communicate their evidence.
This is not surprising given the research studies demonstrating the secondary victimization that
may arise from participation in the criminal process.. . .
Joanne Barrett, ‘‘R. v. S. (J.)— Facilitating Children’s Testimony through the Presumptive Use
of Screens and CCTV” (2011) 57 Crim LQ 370 [Barrett, ‘‘Facilitating Children’s Testimony”].
21 Allen, supra, note 1, at para. 27.
22 1993 CarswellMan 24, 1993 CarswellMan348, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 419 [L.(D.O.)].
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the accused and sensitive to the needs of those who participate as
witnesses . . . .23
R. v. S.D.L. — A Fresh Direction for Video-link Evidence
In the recent case of R. v. S.D.L., the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal
recognized that s. 714.1 provides trial judges ‘‘a wide discretion” in its
application. Nevertheless, Chief Justice MacDonald wrote that it would be
[P]rudent for appellate courts to establish appropriate parameters.
Otherwise, inconsistency and uncertainty will prevail. Or worse,
miscarriages of justice can ensue.24
Chief Justice MacDonald summarized the wide variety of judicial opinions
that had emerged at the level of trial courts across the country as follows:
To date, there has been little appellate authority dealing with this
provision. At the trial level, we see the full spectrum; from judges who
remain guarded about its use (R. v. Ragan, 2008 ABQB 658 at paras.
56-57 and R. v. Munro, 2009 YKTC 125 at para. 18) to those who
demonstrate enthusiasm (R. v. Oh, 2013 ABPC 96 at para. 43 and R. v.
Gibbs (2014), 1097 A.P.R. 149, 114 W.C.B. (2d) 579 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.) at
paras. 32 and 43) and, not surprisingly, everything in between.25
The court provided a detailed list of eight ‘‘guiding principles”26 for trial
judges considering an application for video link evidence under s. 714.1:
1. As long as it does not negatively impact trial fairness or the open courts
principle, testimony by way of video link should be permitted. As the case
law suggests, in appropriate circumstances, it can enhance access to justice.
23 L.(D.O.), ibid, at para. 46 (emphasis added).
24 S.D.L., supra note 6, at para. 8.
25 Ibid, at para. 23. Sossin and Yetnikoff describe this ‘‘judicial ambivalence” towards the
use of video link for remote witnesses as follows:
The judicial ambivalence alluded . . .is not hard to find in a review of the relevant
case law on videoconference hearings. Courts have expressed appreciation for the
obvious advantages of videoconferencing, including reduced costs for transporting
inmates to court from jail, and the reduced cost and increased convenience for those
who live far away from urban centers. From a judge’s perspective, the advantages of
videoconferencing include being able to see a witness face-on rather than from an
angle, and being able to adjust the zoom level at which the judge may view the
witness. However, the courts, public advocates and legal academics have also
expressed a deep concern with both the perceived and actual fairness of
videoconferencing. Where the videoconferencing technology is poor or credibility
is at issue, the courts have resisted cost justifications for substituting a videocon-
ference hearing for an in-person hearing.Lorne Sossin & Zimra Yetnikoff, ‘‘I Can
See Clearly Now: Videoconference Hearings and the Legal Limit on How Tribunals
Allocate Resources” (2007) 25 Windsor YB Access Just 247.
26 S.D.L., supra note 6, at para. 32.
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2. That said, when credibility is an issue, the court should authorize testimony
via s. 714.1 only in the face of exceptional circumstances that personally
impact the proposed witness. Mere inconvenience should not suffice.
3. When the credibility of the complainant is at stake, the requisite exceptional
circumstances described in (2) must be even more compelling.
4. The more significant or complex the proposed video link evidence, the more
guarded the court should be.
5. When credibility will not be an issue, the test should be on a balance of
convenience.
6. Barring unusual circumstances, there should be an evidentiary foundation
supporting the request. This would typically be provided by affidavit. Should
cross examination be required, that could be done by video link.
7. When authorized, the court should insist on advance testing and stringent
quality control measures that should be monitored throughout the entire
process. If unsatisfactory, the decision authorizing the video testimony
should be revisited.
8. Finally, it is noteworthy that in the present matter, the judge authorized the
witnesses to testify “in a courtroom . . . or at the offices of Victims’ Services .
. .”. To preserve judicial independence and the appearance of impartiality,
the video evidence, where feasible, should be taken from a local courtroom.
In providing the above guidelines, the court began from the following
premise. While it remains a ‘‘fundamental aspect of most criminal trials,” there is
no Charter right to face one’s accuser. Rather, the focus must be on whether the
method of testimony presents any impairment to the accused’s ability to cross-
examine a witness so as to undermine their credibility and/or reliability. In other
words, the focus must lie on trial fairness, and the right to a fair trial ‘‘does not
constitute a right to the most favourable procedures available”.27 Citing the same
case law relied upon by Justice Duncan in support of this proposition in Allen,
Chief Justice MacDonald wrote:
Constitutionally, while the accused has a right to be present for his trial
and to make a full answer and defence, it is not necessary that witnesses
testify in the accused’s presence. For example, Macdonald, J.A. for this
Court in R. v. R. (M.E.), [1989] N.S.J. No. 248 at para. 28 explained:
The right to face one’s accusers is not in this day and age to be taken
in the literal sense. In my opinion, it is simply the right of an
accused person to be present in court, to hear the case against him
and to make answer and defence to it. . ..28
27 Barrett, ‘‘Facilitating Children’s Testimony”, supra note 20.
28 S.D.L., supra note 6, at para. 19. As Barrett points out (Barrett, ‘‘Facilitating Children’s
Testimony”, supra note 20), it is for this very same reason that permitting children to
testify via closed circuit video or behind a screen does not result in an unfair trial:
In considering the objectives and validity of s. 486.2 of the Criminal Code, it is important to
distinguish cross-examination from face-to-face confrontation. While the former is a basic tenet
of our legal system, the latter is not. In fact, the history of the common law demonstrates that the
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In sum, to borrow the words of Justice L’Heureux-Dubé in R. v. Levogiannis,
in the case of video link testimony for a remote witness, the ‘‘requisite ‘elements
of confrontation’ remain”.29
The fresh perspective taken by R. v. S.D.L. lies in the very first listed
guideline. Specifically, the court recognized that applications for testimony via
video-link ‘‘should be permitted”30 so long as they do not negatively impact upon
trial fairness or the open court principle. Rather, ‘‘in appropriate circumstances,
[video-link testimony] can enhance access to justice.”31 The only significant
qualification placed on this by the court is that where credibility, rather than
reliability, is in issue, such applications should be granted ‘‘only in the face of
exceptional circumstances that personally impact the proposed witness”. The
clear corollary of the court’s qualification in S.D.L. regarding credibility is that
where reliability is the central issue with respect to evaluating a witness’ evidence,
video-link applications should routinely be granted.
With respect to the outcome of the appeal itself, the court overturned the
decision on video link at the first instance. The appellant had been convicted of
two counts of sexual touching and one count of sexual assault. Credibility was
the central issue at trial. The trial judge had allowed the complainant as well as
his mother to testify via video link from Lloydminster, Alberta. Their evidence
formed the entirety of the Crown’s case (other than brief testimony from an
officer for contextual purposes). Chief Justice MacDonald concluded that this
decision resulted in a miscarriage of justice. The appellant had been denied his
right to make full answer and defence, in large measure due to the technical or
quality problems that had arisen with the video link during testimony.
Specifically, the video link was interrupted numerous times during testimony.
In ordering a new trial, Chief Justice MacDonald wrote:
[T]hese interruptions completely broke the flow of any meaningful
examination or cross examination for witnesses that represented
essentially the Crown’s entire case; a case where credibility was the
only issue. Most of them came at inopportune times, and they occupy a
significant portion of the transcript. In fact, as the attached summary . .
. demonstrates, they were spread out and occupied 23 pages of an 81
page transcript.
Granted, I was not there and did not have the advantage of seeing how these
interruptions played out. As well, I acknowledge that interruptions often occur
even when witnesses testify in person. However, in my view, an objective reading
right of confrontation affords an accused with an opportunity to hear witnesses first hand and to
cross-examine them on their evidence; it does not include the right to compel a witness to look
upon the accused while testifying or vice versa. For almost a century, the common law has
recognized that blocking a child’s view of an accused during the child’s testimony is permissible
and does not result in an unfair trial.
29 Levogiannis, supra note 2, at para. 31
30 S.D.L. , supra note 6, at para. 32.
31 Ibid.
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of the transcript leads to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant’s right to
make a full answer and defence was jeopardized.32
While the technological impediments formed the court’s ‘‘most significant”33
reason for allowing the appeal, a number of concerns accumulated to reinforce
the court’s conclusion that the appellant had been denied his right to make full
answer and defence. Chief Justice MacDonald commented unfavourably on the
fact that the Crown had not laid any evidentiary foundation for its video link
application at trial, relying solely on oral submissions. R. v. S.D.L. is
unambiguous regarding the importance of filing as fulsome a record as feasible
in future applications.
Approximately 13 months elapsed between the granting of the video link
application and the eventual trial, due to unrelated reasons. Chief Justice
MacDonald’s comments in this respect suggest that an onus exists on the Crown
to update the evidentiary record in such circumstances, to ensure that the
underlying circumstance of the application have not changed:
[I]t should be noted that this authorization was granted in December of
2014 for a trial that was to have occurred the next month. However, for
unrelated reasons, the trial ended up being postponed to February of
2016, some 13 months down the road. Yet the authorization was not
revisited. For example, with the luxury of time, could the new trial
dates not have been set to a time more convenient for the proposed
witnesses to return to their native Cape Breton? Or maybe circum-
stances in Lloydminster changed by 2016 so as to make it less
challenging.34
In sum, an evidentiary foundation is an essential ingredient or
‘‘prerequisite”35 to a successful video link application.
With respect to hardship, the Crown argued that if the complainant and his
mother were forced to travel to the courthouse for in-person testimony, the
complainant’s father would be left alone to care for the family’s two other
children (including a four-year-old). Although a sympathetic circumstance, this
type of familial strain caused by the mother’s absence does not appear
‘‘exceptional”. Nor does the submission that the complainant would miss
several days of school. While there would be ‘‘personal [. . .] impact” on the
complainant, this type of scholastic hardship is not uncommon in the reality of
testifying during a complex criminal trial. Indeed, Chief Justice MacDonald
commented as follows with respect to the Crown’s position on hardship:
[I]n a case where credibility was the only issue and given the subject
matter, it is hard to imagine more significant and sensitive testimony.
32 S.D.L. , ibid, at paras. 63, 64.
33 Ibid, at para. 43.
34 S.D.L., ibid, at para. 42.
35 Ibid, at para. 41.
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Yet, the Crown offered nothing compelling to suggest that testifying in
person would personally impact these witnesses. . ..36
In its oral submissions, the Crown adverted to the cost of transporting the
two witnesses from Lloydminster as one factor to consider, pegging it as roughly
$3,500. While cost remains an enumerated consideration under s. 714.1, this
argument is unlikely to carry the day under the guidelines of R. v. S.D.L. To
reiterate the words of Chief Justice McDonald: ‘‘when credibility is an issue, the
court should authorize testimony via s. 714.1 only in the face of exceptional
circumstances that personally impact the proposed witness”.37 The cost to be
borne by the Crown to transport the witnesses is not an ‘‘exceptional
circumstance” and does not ‘‘personally impact” the witness. Therefore, this
consideration does not advance the position of the applicant seeking a video link
where the Court repeatedly characterizes credibility as the ‘‘only”38 issue at trial.
As of the date of writing, R. v. Dapena-Huerta39 is the only reported
treatment of R. v. S.D.L. The witness was unable to leave her home for the
purpose of testimony due to a medical condition. In allowing her to testify before
a jury via Skype, Justice Healey emphasized that the central concern with respect
to the witness’s testimony was reliability, rather than credibility. Justice Healey
found that the use of Skype in this manner would not undermine trial fairness,
adding that a jury instruction could be given:
I do not see that the jury will be negatively affected. They have already
seen one witness testify from outside of the courtroom by video link
pursuant to s. 486.2(1) because of her age. The required mid-trial
instruction was given. A similar instruction can be given with this
witness, indicating that the jury is to assess the witness’ evidence in the
same manner as if it had been received from inside the courtroom, that the
procedure used has nothing to do with the guilt or the innocence of the
respondent and that no such inferences are to be drawn from the use of
the procedure.40
CONCLUSION
The ability to hear a witness’s evidence in chief and have that witness cross-
examined will not be seriously impacted if done via a reliable, continuous video
link since the witness remains in the virtual presence of the parties and the court
during her testimony. If reliability is the central issue with respect to evaluating a
witness’s evidence, video-link applications should routinely be granted where
there is no negative impact upon trial fairness or the open court principle. In this
36 S.D.L., ibid, at para. 40.
37 Ibid, at para. 32.
38 Ibid, at paras. 34, 40.
39 2017 ONSC 7530, 2017 CarswellOnt 20040 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Dapena-Huerta].
40 Dapena-Huerta, ibid, at para. 13 (emphasis added).
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way, the use of technology in the courtroom can contribute to the truth seeking
function of the trial process and provide support for vulnerable victims and
witnesses who may otherwise face greater personal costs through the process of
testimony.
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